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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of modern Israel is plagued by inner and outer instability in 
the increasingly volatile Middle East region. In 65 years of existence, Israel has taken 
part in 8 wars, which have put an immense burden on its economy. It also lacks 
natural resources and has a hostile climate for agriculture.  Contrary to expectations, 
this tiny country of 8 million people has the 22nd largest economy in the world, with 
$235 billion. One of the main reasons for this is that Israel has the world’s largest 
number of high tech start-up companies in proportion to its population, and attracts 
more venture capital investments per capita than any other country. 
Israel boasts the highest density of start-ups in the world. There are a total 
of 3,850 start-ups, one for every 1,844 Israelis. More Israeli companies are listed on 
the NASDAQ exchange than all the companies from the entire European continent.1 
The number of Israeli companies traded on the largest stock exchange in the world, 
New York Stock Exchange, ranks third, behind only the United States and China.2 In 
recent years, Israel has become a global exporter of ideas, innovation and technology.  
Worldwide, start-ups tend to develop in clusters. Clusters differ 
significantly between countries and even between different regions in a country.3 
However, due to Israel’s small territory (about the size of Silicon Valley), all of it is 
considered one eco-system, with high concentration of small to medium sized firms in 
different stages of development, and large complimentary services industry such as 
patent law firms and high-tech HR recruitment specialists. Concentrating on start-up 
                                          
1 Dan Senor and Saul Singer, Start-Up Nation: the Story of Israel's Economic Miracle, International Edition ed. (New York: 
Twelve, 2009), 13.  
2 David Ogul, "Israel: A Perfect Example," San Diego Jewish Journal, December 2012 (accessed April 18, 2014), 
http://sdjewishjournal.com/site/4570/israel-a-perfect-example/  
3 Thomas Gries and Wim Naude, "Entrepreneurship and Regional Economic Growth: Towards a General Theory of Start-
ups," Innovation: The    European Journal Of Social Science Research 22, no. 3 (2009): 310. 
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eco-systems in which large numbers of start-ups seem to develop, both mitigates the 
issue of the dynamic nature of start-ups, and allows focus on the factors that facilitate 
the emergence of these clusters.  
This research will attempt to answer what factors have made Israel a 
successful incubator for start-up businesses.4 The first part of the literature review 
attempts to sketch a theoretical framework for research of start-ups. Most of the 
research into start-ups is relatively recent, and lacks a systematic approach, even more 
so in the case of Israel. There is no single theory that defines the start-up structure and 
the difference between start-up cultures in various countries 5 . Start-ups vary 
dramatically in size, ambition, culture, and life expectancy as they quickly evolve, or 
quickly flame out, related to the high paced evolution of the technology in which they 
specialize. However, despite the unpredictability of the process, there is a great 
interest in the right “recipe” for developing a good start-up environment. The select 
literature about success and failure of other start-up environments around the world 
would complement the Israeli case study.  
As natural resources dwindle worldwide, the task of allocating country 
assets effectively becomes a vital concern. Developing countries strive to maximize 
growth within their particular restricted conditions. Using human capital effectively, 
despite instability or the lack of natural resources, may help address this greater 
problem. Studying and binding together the successful development patterns in 
seemingly different case studies would help build wider, more comprehensive models 
for other countries. 
                                          
4 In this research, “Start-up” is used as the generally accepted term for a small, private enterprise of high-tech technology. 
5 Franz Todtling and Herta Wanzenbock, "Regional Differences in Structural Characteristics of Start-ups," Entrepreneurship & 
Regional  Development 15, no. 4 (2003): 351.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
A. World and Theoretical Perspective 
Innovation clusters are “places with dense webs of interconnected 
technology companies, customers, and suppliers.”6 The biggest, and most successful, 
start-up clusters in the world are Silicon Valley, Beijing, Bangalore (India), Boston 
and Israel.7 Much research was devoted to the success of those clusters, Silicon Valley 
in particular, and the attempts of establishing new ones, usually unsuccessfully.  
According to MIT, factors such as liberal immigration and venture capital 
laws improve the chances of a cluster to flourish. Proximity to higher education is 
also an advantage; Boston has more than 85 universities and Beijing more than 70.8 
Silicon Valley success was also attributed to close proximity to major research 
universities – Stanford and University of California, as noted by many scholars.9  
O’Mara claims that Silicon Valley is hard to duplicate, due to it being a 
product of Cold War political economy, “distinctively American, rooted in particularly 
American systems of governance, market structures and educational institutions.”10 
O’Mara notes that pre-Cold War the comfortable weather and business culture, as well 
as proximity to universities, had supported a vibrant scientific community in the 
Valley. However, it lacked the necessary capital to transform it to start-up cluster that 
it became later. That capital was provided thanks to new demand for strengthened 
                                          
6 "World Innovation Clusters." Technology Review 116, no. 5 (September 2013): 90 
7 Methodlogy of determining the biggest clusters differ in the literature, some research look at the size of venture capital, some 
on the amount of firms, or the amount of workers. Those five clusters are usually featured in all methodologies. 
8 Ibid., 90. 
9 O'Mara, Margaret Pugh. 2006. "Cold War politics and scientific communities: the case of Silicon Valley." Interdisciplinary 
Science Reviews 31, no. 2: 121. 
10 Ibid., 122. 
11 | P a g e  
 
military defense that caused an  unprecedented increase in public investment in 
science.  
Numerous studies claim Silicon Valley is hard to impossible to duplicate. 
Several different reasons are given. While O’Mara focused on Cold War funding, 
Anna Lee Saxenian in her seminal book Regional advantage: culture and competition 
in Silicon Valley and Route 128 is focused on professional networks and easy 
information exchange. She notes that the firms in Silicon Valley competed and 
cooperated at the same time. Research by Wadhava agrees with that thesis and notes 
the cooperation between science and engineering departments in academia, with 
strong links to local firms, “all focusing research on the needs of industry, creating 
culture of cooperation and information exchange.”11 He also points out another factor 
that has drawn much positive attention to the success of the Valley – the high 
percentage of diversity, which is according to many, is a necessary part of successful 
innovation. According to Wadhava, “from 1995 to 2005, 52% of Silicon Valley start-
ups had one or more people born outside the U.S. as founders, twice the rate in the 
U.S. as a whole.”12 In another study by Saxenian “there were 2,001 Chinese CEOs 
and 774 Indian CEOs heading Silicon Valley companies in 1998. Together, they 
employed 58,282 people and accounted for 17% of sales ($16 billion) and 24% of the 
Valley’s high-tech firms.”13 
Etzkowitz and Dzisah also focus on the necessity of informal exchange of 
ideas for successful start-up eco-system. By meticulously comparing Silicon Valley to 
another of the five largest start-up clusters, Boston, the authors determined that 
                                          
11 Wadhwa, Vivek. "Silicon Valley Can't Be Copied." Technology Review 116, no. 5 (September 2013): 87.  
12 Ibid., 88. 
13 Saxenian, Anna Lee , Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,report to the Public Policy Institute of California, 
June1999. 
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regional cooperation, and specifically “(an) effective triple helix of university –
industry – government interactions”14 are necessary, and need to be facilitated by 
informal networks. Additionally, Etzkowitz and Dzisah echo O’Mara’s idea of the 
importance of federal government as “early costumer”. However they draw the 
opposite conclusion; by expanding the scope of the research to include another 
successful start-up cluster, albeit one that developed at a different time and pace from 
Silicon Valley, Etzkowitz and Dzisah concluded that Silicon Valley can indeed be 
duplicated.15   
For the purpose of stronger inner logic of the research, I also examined the 
literature about the less successful innovation clusters. A fascinating econometrics 
research by Rodrigez-Pose has tested 152 small innovation clusters in Europe. The 
author made a choice I admired greatly with “looking not just at the brightest trees in 
the forest (…) but also at the average and even the moribund trees—that is, the 
clusters that happen to be located perhaps in the wrong environments, the wrong 
sectors, and with inadequate management and policies.”16 The study’s conclusion 
corresponded with Silicon Valley, Boston and Beijing case studies – proximity to 
education centers has a major influence on success of innovation clusters.17 Another 
article by Leung also focuses on a high-tech cluster that hasn’t been successful – 
Singapore. One of the main reasons of failure is the lack of diversity in the workforce, 
which is a result of suspicion and resentment of the foreign talent.18 The importance 
of immigrant workforce is also the main idea in another article about the failure of 
                                          
14 Etzkowitz, Henry, and James Dzisah. 2008. "Unity and Diversity in High-tech Growth and Renewal: Learning from Boston 
and Silicon Valley." European Planning Studies 16, no. 8: 1022.  
15 Ibid., 123. 
16 Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés, and Fabrice Comptour. 2012. "Do Clusters Generate Greater Innovation and Growth? An Analysis of 
European Regions*." Professional Geographer 64, no. 2: 227 
17  Ibid., 227. 
18 Leong, Bernard. 2006. "Finding the Golden Path: Can Singapore be a Silicon Valley? (Cover story)." Innovation, October. 63.   
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Singapore cluster by Leng Tan,19 and another about the success of Silicone Valley by 
George Koo. 20   Chandra Malairaja examined the establishing process of the 
Malaysian Cluster. Malaysia has the benefit of learning from other countries 
experienced in establishing new clusters. For example, networking development is 
required not only between firms, but also between the university, industry and the 
government. While as O’Mara, Etzkowitz and Dzisah have shown, this interaction 
developed in Silicon Valley organically due to Cold War necessity. In the case of 
Malaysia, “the role of the government in capacity building is expected to bridge the 
gap between university research and its industrial application. (…) This partnership 
could also be extended to address various other issues affecting the region, such as 
labor and immigration matters, quality of education, infrastructure requirements, 
research grants and funding, tax policies, etc.21 
At the first glance, it seems the literature about start-ups goes in several 
disconnected directions at once. But it has one thing it is mostly in agreement about – 
a number of factors made it possible for the Silicon Valley to emerge as a successful 
case of innovation cluster. While the factors and their relative influence are being 
argued about, most writers don’t look at the actual monetary investment in the Silicon 
Valley, but the demographical and sociological factors that allowed it to flourish. 
Many of the new Silicone Valley “clones” has received substantial government 
investments. It seems that the scholars agree that the most influential factors are not 
institution based, but are informal, and harder to define, factors such as the dynamism 
and entrepreneurial spirit of the companies, the way business is conducted in terms of 
risk taking; the willingness to accept failures, the ability to network and collaborate 
                                          
19 Lay Leng, Tan. "Transplanting the Silicon Valley Experience to Singapore. (Cover story)." Innovation 6, no. 3 (October 2006): 
39. 
20 Koo, George. 2006. "Silicon Valley's Success Built by Immigrants." Chinese American Forum 21, no. 4: 38.  
21 Chandra Malairaja, "Learning from the Silicon Valley and Implications for Technological Leapfrogging." International Journal 
Of Technology Management & Sustainable Development 2, no. 2 (June 2003): 89.  
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with your competition and the diversity of background and ideas – all have in 
common the fact they are informal, and have more in common with the business 
culture, than business institutions. 
 
B. Israeli Case Study Literature 
The research into Israel’s start-up cluster is relatively recent, and so far 
rather limited. One of the seminal works in the field, Start-Up Nation: the Story of 
Israel's Economic Miracle, was published just in 2009. The book relies on precise 
economic data from sources as diverse as NASDAQ, World Economy Forum, Israel 
Venture Capital Research Central, Central Bureau of Statistics (Israel), United Nations 
Development Programme and the CIA.22  The research is complimented by hundreds 
of interviews with business insiders in the international innovation community as well 
as Israeli start-ups. The book’s research is comprehensive and its reputation well 
deserved.  It is, however, focused heavily on demographical, historical and 
geopolitical factors that can be viewed as unique to Israel. 
First, Israel’s diversity brings together people of different backgrounds 
and experiences to foster a wealth of new ideas and solutions. Though thought of as a 
Jewish State, Israel has seventy different nationalities living within its borders. The 
second key element pointed out by the research is Israel’s military and defense 
industry and its influence in “encouraging problem solving and leadership 
optimization.”23 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is integrated into Israeli society with 
a high degree of reciprocity. Most Israeli citizens are drafted, serve for a minimum of 
two to three years, and then remain part of the reserve forces as they move on in their 
                                          
22 Senor and Singer, Start-up Nation, 332-361. 
23 Ibid., 71. 
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respective careers. One’s unit and position in the military is an important factor for 
employers in Israel, with many companies targeting for recruitment graduates of 
specific military programs. Thirdly, the authors focus on the way Israel’s “adversity, 
like necessity, breeds inventiveness.”24   
Separately, a variety of scholars focused on these factors in more depth. In 
particular, the heterogeneous demographic has attracted much attention. According to 
Winters (2009), Israel has immigrants from more than 140 countries.25 In addition to 
diversity of nationalities, different interpretations of what it means to be Jewish, wide 
disparities in religious observance and secularism, and various sub-cultural 
differences remain. The scale of religious observance is as varied as secular, Orthodox, 
and ultra-Orthodox Jews. Within the nationalities, the largest division is between 
Russian immigrants (mostly secular), native-born Israelis, Ethiopian, Sephardim 
(Jews from North African or Middle East Muslim countries), and Ashkenazim (Jews 
from Eastern Europe). Additionally, Muslim and Christian Arabs, Druze, and other 
smaller ethnic and religious groups are present.26   
Despite the sharp differences, in a study of secular/religious and 
Jewish/Arab fully integrated schools, Winters found that “Classes with diverse 
populations help create a living, dynamic laboratory for understanding multicultural 
approaches, personal growth, and modeling future work”.27 
Several researchers focused on civilian-military relations in Israel. Israel 
is the only democracy in which the military has occupied a central place for such a 
long period. While it has taken a dominant place in other societies, for example 
                                          
24 Ibid., 16. 
25  Jeffrey Winter, "Preparing Teachers to Work with Diversity Issues in Israel: Paradigms, Puzzles, and Praxis," Multicultural 
Perspectives 11, no. 1(2009): 38. 
26 Ibid., 38. 
27 Ibid., 40. 
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Britain or the United States during World War II, it has done so in Israel for a much 
lengthier period of time.28  
Barak and Sheffer (2010), examine the formal and informal connections 
and the dynamic, prolonged mutual influence of civilian and security sectors in the 
cultural sphere, political system, society, the economy, and the public discourse.29 The 
authors reject the traditional theory of civilian-military relations as two separate 
systems, each trying to assume control of the other.30 Barak and Sheffer note that this 
paradigm imbued with Western ethnocentrism, not applicable to Israel,31 and that the 
informal exchanges, which concern various patterns of public policymaking and 
behavior, are by no means random and haphazard but are routinized and have 
assumed a continuous nature.32 Unlike the traditional approach of viewing the military 
and the civilian sectors as homogenous, autonomous and completely separate, the 
authors view these sectors as consisting of many actors that intermingle closely, and 
form a highly informal policy network – the Security Network.33 Due to mandatory 
military service, the increased penetration of active and retired personnel of the 
security sector into most of the civilian spheres, results in penetration of military 
values and influences of most civilian sectors.  
Despite the relatively recent publication of the Start-Up Nation book in 
2009, the world of high-tech innovation is high paced and there are already several 
articles elaborating on several themes from the book and supplementing its economic 
data. In 2010, Senor and Saul Singer wrote the follow-up article “What Next for the 
                                          
28 Edna Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari, The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1999), 4. 
29 Oren Barak and Gabriel Sheffer, Militarism and Israeli Society (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 1. 
30 Ibid., 17. 
31 Ibid., 19. 
32 Ibid., 21. 
33 Ibid., 26. 
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Start-Up Nation?” refining the connection between military and civilian complex in 
Israel. The authors maintain that while it is often assumed that the  most  important 
connection  between  the military and high-tech  industry occurs  when  military  
innovations  are given civilian applications (the internet, for example), “the  
connection  is  broader  and deeper than  that.  The military contribution to the 
tech  scene  is  cultural  as  much  as,  or  more  than  it  is technological.  
Young Israelis who achieve junior  officer  rank (…) are taught  leadership  and  
teamwork  skills  in  an  intensive way,  regardless of  their direct exposure to 
technology.  They learn that completing missions often requires improvisation and 
innovation”.34 
Vamseedhar (2007), elaborates on technologies that were initially 
developed for military purposes, but were later developed in the civilian sector by 
graduates from elite programming units in the military. Electro optics and Internet 
firewalls, originally created to meet security needs, proved highly exportable and later 
were developed and perfected for worldwide use by a leading Israeli company, Check 
Point Software Technologies. Check Point is one of the first generation of Israeli start-
ups.  It exemplifies the quick transformation the Israeli economy went through in the 
1990s. It was established in 1993 by three graduates of “Unit 8200”, an Israeli 
Intelligence Corps unit responsible for collecting signal intelligence. The three 
founders developed the core civilian technology of Check Point, based on their work 
in 8200. By 1996, Check Point was the leading expert in firewall technology in the 
world, has developed one of the first VPN networks, and now its revenue is estimated 
as 1.2 billion USD.35   
                                          
34 Dan Senor and Saul Singer, “What Next for the Start-Up Nation?” The Wilson Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2010): 65.  
35 Vamseedhar, Israel : Technology Prowess and Entrepreneurial Dilemmas, 4. 
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Vamseedhar’s main focus is on government involvement in technology 
industry. The author claims that two major initiatives in the early 1990s, in venture 
capital and in research, have contributed to the formation of the military-industrial-
civilian network. The “Yozma” initiative was founded in 1993 to create a start-up 
network, and Office of the Chief Scientist (OCS) formed the national incubator 
project. The incubator project invested in start-ups who were refused funds by private 
sector. The project sought to take ideas or lab projects and turn them into companies 
through relatively modest grants of $200,000 to $400,000 annually over a 2-year 
period.36   
Another influential researcher in the field is Professor Gil Avnimelech. 
Avnimelech has co-written more than 65 studies about entrepreneurship in general 
and Israeli start-up eco system in particular. Unlike other seminal work in the field, 
Avnimelech is focused on institutional structures and governmental policies that 
contributed to the development of the eco-system. Avnimelech sees the venture capital 
investment as a necessary part of the start-up eco system, and for the purpose of 
creating a successful eco-system, one of the roles of the government is to encourage 
domestic and foreign venture capital investments, to facilitate, and to create favorable 
conditions for them in the cluster’s/nation’s economy.   
His article “Evolutionary interpretation of venture capital policy in Israel, 
Germany, UK and Scotland” divides the evolutionary process in Israel to three stages: 
background conditions (1969–1984), pre-emergence (1985–1992) and emergence 
(1993–2000).37 According to the writers,  “by  the  late  1960s  a  significant  
science,  technology and  higher  education  infrastructure  had  been  
                                          
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 Avnimelech, Gil, Alessandro Rosiello, and Morris Teubal. "Evolutionary interpretation of venture capital policy in Israel, 
Germany, UK and Scotland." Science & Public Policy (SPP) 37, no. 2 (March 2010): 103. 
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established, a process which had started in 1925”. The Office of the Chief Scientist 
(OCS) at the Ministry of Industry and Trade was established in 1969 to explore and 
built on those favorable conditions. During the “background conditions” phase, after 
the establishment of OCS, three new universities and a number of research institutes 
were established and innovation policy was initiated with the OCS’s grants to research 
and development in private firms, as-well as to firms cooperating with US firms.38 In 
second, “pre-emergence” phase, the OCS shifted focus to establishment of domestic 
venture capital market.39 In those years, suitable configurations of start-up and 
venture capital firms were selected for further investment by government program 
“Yozma”, as was discussed by Vamseedhar above. It is also important to note that this 
phase coincided with global changes such as liberalization of communication markets 
in USA, Japan and UK that positively affected the Silicon Valley start-ups. It also 
became increasingly easier for foreign start-ups to float in NASDAQ. The successful 
implementation of the “Yozma” Program has triggered the “emergence phase” in 1993. 
As a result, the number of start-ups increased from 300 to approximately 3,000 with 
the total capital invested approximating 10 billion USD by 2000.40 
These ideas and phases are further developed in his 2008 research “A 
Five-phase Entrepreneurial Oriented Innovation and Technology Policy Profile: The 
Israeli Experience. In it, he recommends the phased innovation policy process that 
Israel went through as a model that other countries looking to develop their clusters 
can learn from, though cautions somewhat paradoxically that “Israel has a very 
peculiar innovation system and a specific development path, which cannot be taken as 
an example for other countries and regions. Therefore, this experience cannot be 
                                          
38 Ibid., 103. 
39 Ibid., 104 
40 Ibid., 104. 
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repeated precisely in other countries.”41 The aspects that makes Israeli experience 
“peculiar” to Avnimelech, are “strong academic base and very high quality human 
capital, a very strongly developed military R&D industrial complex, entrepreneurial 
culture, strong relations with human capital and academic institutions in other 
countries, strong relations with the US technological and capital markets, and 
government coherent innovation strategies.”42 Thus, even Avnimelech, the strongest 
quantitative researcher focused mainly on institution contributions to Israeli start-ups 
eco-system, eventually results to a culture-based caveat in his explanation. 
   
  
                                          
41  Avnimelech, Gil. "A Five-phase Entrepreneurial Oriented Innovation and Technology Policy Profile: The Israeli 
Experience." European Planning Studies 16, no. 1 (January 2008): 94.  
42  Avnimelech, Gil. "A Five-phase Entrepreneurial Oriented Innovation and Technology Policy Profile: The Israeli 
Experience." European Planning Studies 16, no. 1 (January 2008): 97.  
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C. Comparing Israeli and World-wide Literature  
While the scholars are in disagreement about the deciding factors to a 
success of a start-up cluster, the world and Israel-case literature seemed to agree on 
one key requisite: in order to flourish, a start-up cluster must be an eco-system. It has 
to have more than a collection of start-up firms, it has to have the right institutions, 
but more importantly, it has to have a complex network of informal interactions. 
The scholars are divided on the factor that has the biggest influence on the 
eco-system. Certainly, the phenomenal success of Silicon Valley had led to much 
thought to whether it can be duplicated. Even the actual architecture of the valley has 
been studied in depth. Several factors have been agreed on though, even if their 
relative importance has not. First, access to education institutions is important. Second, 
the cooperation of research education institutes and industry, and between the 
different firms within the industry is important. The cooperation and communication 
is facilitated by the third factor, informal networks. The nature and quality of the 
human capital is also necessary, with diversity a vital forth factor. Countries and 
States with liberal immigration policy, comfortable climate, and corporate culture that 
encourages hopping from firm to firm allows firms the choice and the competition of 
the best minds available worldwide.  
At the first glance, the case study of Israel satisfies all these conditions. As 
the studies of the education system by Winters and Menahem shown, not only is the 
start-up cluster diverse – the whole country is a dynamic melting pot of over seventy 
nationalities. Those are different enough to bring diversity of ideas to every project, 
but unified enough through the mandatory military service to prevent those 
differences to become a major disadvantage.  The army also provides the base for the 
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informal network, as exemplified by Barak and Sheffer’s study, and provides the 
technological basis and education, as noted by Vamseedhar. Israel also has the largest 
percentage of engineers in OECD countries, thanks in part to the importance of 
education in the Jewish tradition, and in part thanks to an immigration of highly 
skilled labor from the former USSR in the 90s.   
However, both Israel-focused and Silicone Valley-focused scholars tend to 
point out the uniqueness of their development process. As much as the research 
regarding Israel’s development is well meaning and extensive, at times it exhibits the 
same shortcomings the literature about the development of Korea, Japan, and 
Singapore sometimes exhibit. Their rapid growth, despite the scarcity of natural 
resources and slow restoration after Second World War, bewildered many. Frequently, 
development specialists develop an overly narrow, country-specific approach.  As 
Gries and Naude note, most empirical studies on the determinants of start-up rates 
make use of regional data within a specific country, because comparisons between 
countries are often difficult due to non-comparable data and definitions. 43 
Furthermore, the language that developed in literature surrounding Israel, Silicon 
Valley, Korea and others is a language of “miracle”, of something that is impressive, 
due to the countries unique character. Praising these countries well deserved progress 
boosts the national pride, and invites further foreign investment. It does, however, 
limit the academic scope of the research, and constrains our ability to expand success 
to other countries. 
 
  
                                          
43 Thomas Gries and Wim Naude, "Entrepreneurship and Regional Economic Growth: Towards a General Theory of Start-
ups," Innovation: The European Journal Of Social Science Research 22, no. 3 (2009): 309. 
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III.  CASE STUDY - ISRAEL 
 
Previous chapter established the factors vital to establishment of start-up 
eco-system such as government-industry-academia cooperation, diversity of 
population, education and informal networks. This section will showcase how these 
aspects are exhibited in the Israeli case study.  
Academia-Government-Industry cooperation 
The government policies were vital in creating the knowledge economy. 
All science and technology policies and budgets are managed exclusively through 
OCS – Office of Chief Scientist, under the Ministry of Economy. Established in the 
early 70s, the OCS had several policies specifically targeting increase of cooperation 
between underdeveloped sectors of the economy. At the first stage, the OCS kick-
started the venture capital industry. “Yozma” program was created as a government 
VC fund of $100 million that had two functions. The first was to invest $8 million in 
10 private venture funds, which would be 40% or less of the total capital— the rest 
was provided by other private limited partners. To get this financing, the funds’ 
managers had to secure investment and partnership from at least one local and one 
established foreign financial institution. Thus the OCS encouraged the involvement of 
the local private sector, as-well as international cooperation. 
At this stage it will helpful to explain in short the main revenues in which 
OCS operates. OCS activity targets innovation in all stages of its development: “pre-
seed and seed programs”, “Incubators programs”, “Pre-Competitive and Long-
Term R&D Programs”, “International programs” and the “National R&D Fund”.   
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“Pre-seed and seed programs” support the wide range of activities 
required of entrepreneurs who are taking their first steps towards developing a new 
technological initiative before industrial production becomes feasible. The 
“Incubators” encourage technological innovation by creating a system that will 
provide entrepreneurs with a comfortable and convenient incubator in which they can 
conduct the research, development and organization that is necessary for transforming 
a technology-based idea into a commercial product. “Pre-Competitive and Long-
Term R&D Programs” Support generic R&D that is still far from practical 
implementation in the market and forming bonds between the academia and the 
industry that will ultimately produce products based on advanced knowledge and 
technology. “National R&D Fund Programs” –help budding and mature companies 
develop processes of converting theoretic knowledge into a functional product. And 
the “International programs” help Israeli companies form strategic links with 
companies abroad in order to develop their competitive capabilities and their ability to 
penetrate international markets.   
When establishing VC and FDI industries was deemed vital, the OCS has 
made sure the necessary knowledge and stimulants would flow through all areas of its 
activity. The “Yozma” program demanded from the companies in need of 
governmental assistance to involve private sector, was under the “National R&D Fund 
Programs” umbrella that targeted “mature” companies. However, meeting the goal of 
strengthening private sector involvement was not left to mere chance and to the 
mature companies only; pre-seed and seed programs that assist individual inventors, 
young entrepreneurs and even students, started to include business education. 
Inventors in the earliest stages of their innovation projects were provided with not 
only the funds and necessary technological know-how to help the project to mature, 
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but knowledge such as evaluation of the technological and commercial potential of a 
project, filing for a patent, building a prototype, drafting a business plan and initial 
business development. 44         
The goal of the second revenue of OCS activity – “Incubators” is to 
transform innovative technological ideas in their early, high-risk stages into viable 
startup companies capable of raising money and operating on their own. 45 In regard 
start-up companies themselves, they continue receiving mentorship from industry 
leaders from the private sector in their field. However, the incubators are a vital 
contributor to the private sector-government cooperation since they strongly 
encourage private sector involvement through the principle of “risk sharing”: in the 
first two years, most of the risk is taken by the government. An incubator licensee can 
invest only 15% of the approved budget of any new project, with the government 
providing the rest. All incubator programs are run as grants that are repayable to the 
OCS on successful completion of the project only upon generation of sales, in the 
form of a percentage of the revenues annually.46 While the Incubator licensee invests  
only 15% of the project, they receive up to 50% of the shares.47 This encourages the 
active participation of the private sector.48  
Since 1991 and to the end of 2012, the government initiated over 1,700 
companies with a total cumulative government investment of over 650 Million 
Dollars. Over 1,500 companies had matured and left the incubators. Of these 
graduates, 60% have successfully attracted private investments. By the end of 2012, 
~40% of the incubators graduates are still up and running. The total cumulative 
                                          
44 (http://www.economy.gov.il/Publications/Publications/DocLib/RnD_IncentivePrograms_English.pdf) 
45 Chief Scientis Office, Incubators, Accessed July 7, 2015.http://www.incubators.org.il/article.aspx?id=1703  
46 Chief Scientis Office, Incubators, Accessed July 7, 2015.http://www.incubators.org.il/article.aspx?id=1703  
47 Chief Scientis Office, Incubators, Accessed July 7, 2015.http://www.incubators.org.il/article.aspx?id=1703 
48 Chief Scientis Office, Incubators, Accessed July 7, 2015. http://www.incubators.org.il/article.aspx?id=1703 
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private investment in graduated incubator companies reached over 3.5 Billion Dollars. 
This means that on every Dollar the government invested in an incubator company, 
the company raised an additional 5 – 6 Dollars from the private sector. 
The OECD classifies Israel’s science and technology policy as “bottom-up 
approach”. 49. The R&D in Israel has been a national priority from the mid-80s, but 
while the importance of investment in science and technology remains a national 
priority, the implementation is done through policies that target specific areas.   
Having achieved the level of cooperation with the private sector, locally 
and abroad, that caused the innovation eco-system to thrive,  the “Yozma” program 
was discontinued (Some principles of it still exist in other OCS programs, mostly 
those which target international cooperation). The OCS has turned its attention to the 
third aspect of the triple helix: cooperation between the government, industry and the 
academia.    
Academia participation in the start-up eco-system is harder to measure, 
and since it involves frequently far into the future, “blue skies” innovation, it is a field 
that is all too easy to neglect, focusing on existing science and technologies that can 
be developed and exploited for revenue faster. However, focusing on existing 
technologies makes the country, or a company, more vulnerable to global economic 
and technological trends and crises. Investing in future, yet un-exploitable technology, 
provided Israel with greater flexibility in changing markets.  
To achieve better cooperation with academia, OCS employs several dozen 
programs under the “Pre-Competitive and Long-Term R&D Programs”. Those 
                                          
49  http://libproxy.kdischool.ac.kr/b0d1677/_Lib_Proxy_Url/www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-
technology-and-industry-outlook-2014_sti_outlook-2014-en 
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programs support generic R&D that is still far from practical implementation in the 
market and forming bonds between the academia and the industry that will ultimately 
produce products based on advanced knowledge and technology. If the incubator 
programs illustrate best the principle of risk sharing, the “pre-competitive and long 
term R&D programs illustrate well the role Israeli government plays in bridging the 
gap between the academia and private sector, as-well as growing attention to 
specification that is the trend in the last decade or so. The pre-competitive programs 
(which exist under the name “Magnet programs” under the OCS) target niche research 
that is in need of development. A wide variety of fields is supported, however they are 
adjusted slightly every few years, to include new types of fringe research, or to invest 
in a field that the OCS deems ripe to be promoted in the mainstream research or 
private sector. For an example of the latter, bio-tech and genome research were 
considered not necessarily beneficial economically for many years, but were 
supported under general programs of the “Pre-Competitive and Long-Term R&D 
Programs” umbrella. Recently they were promoted specifically by the Israeli 
government as it becomes possible that they will be profitable in the next few years.   
At the time of composition of this research, Magnet had several specific 
programs: for example, “NOFAR” provides support and funding in the field 
of biotechnology, nanotechnology and development of medical equipment. 
“MEIMAD” supports R&D technologies that can have both military and civilian use 
(media streaming, for example, encoding, cyber security, etc). “TSATAM” gives 
grants for research in Biomedical engineering, biotech, human genome etc. those 
fields are selected because the research in them is long-term, and while it provides 
long term benefit for the science field on the whole, the research is far from practical 
implementation and therefore is not likely to attract investment from private sector. 
28 | P a g e  
 
Likewise, “KAMIN” grants are given to researches in universities to encourage 
production of functional research in the future (mid process grant) “MAGNETON” – 
grants for technology transfer between academia and commercial companies.  So, 
“MAGNETON” targets scientific research after the phase in which “KAMIN” assists. 
In conclusion, the government sees its main task as bridging the gap 
between academia and the private sector. It achieves that task through numerous 
activities and programs, stimulating both the inventors, companies at all stages of 
development, private sector and academics. The main tool of the Israeli government is 
the principle of “risk sharing”. It absorbs most of the loses in unsuccessful 
investments, but allows the private sector to take equal parts of profit, and it invests in 
projects, such as in ““Pre-Competitive and Long-Term R&D Programs” that are 
guarantee no profit in the near future, in the hopes it will benefit all, academia and 
private sector alike, in the remote, obscure future. 
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Human capital: Diversity and Education 
As immigrant country, Israel has been naturally diverse from the day it 
was established with immigrants from 140 countries living within its borders. The 
diversity in population grew even further in the early 1990s. Beginning in 1989, Israel 
absorbed a wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union that resulted in a 20% 
increase in population by the mid-1990s. Due to demographic characteristics of the 
Soviet immigrants, the number of young people between ages 20-24 eligible for 
higher education in Israel, grew by 42%.50 The education system responded well to 
the growing demand.  By 2000, institutional capacity began to exceed the number of 
applicants51, showing great adaptability. By 2007, research showed that about 28% of 
Israel’s population has university degrees and 1.35% of them are engineers or 
scientists, more than in any other OECD nation.52 
The brain drain/gain/circulation approach provides an additional 
perspective on the issue. The prevailing approach to a high value workforce leaving 
the home country for better opportunities (usually) in favor of the West, has regarded 
this phenomenon as “brain drain” – a loss to the home country. AnnaLee Saxenian is 
one of the seminal researchers on the subject of Silicone Valley and one of the 
scholars that popularized the term “brain circulation” as an alternative perspective. 53 
According to her, the foreign born engineers and scientists in Silicon Valley have 
created social and professional networks to mobilize the information and the capital to 
start technology firms. More importantly, those communities provide links to 
entrepreneurs at home, building transnational communities of knowledge. They also 
                                          
50 Gila Menahem, "The Transformation of Higher Education in Israel Since the 1990s: The Role of Ideas and Policy 
Paradigms," Governance 21, no. 4 (2008): 510. 
51 Ibid., 514. 
52 Paidipati Vamseedhar, Israel: Technology Prowess and Entrepreneurial Dilemmas (India: IBSCDC, 2007): 8. 
53 Saxenian, AnnaLee. "BRAIN CIRCULATION. How high-skill immigration makes everyone better off." Brookings Review 20, 
no. 1 (2002): 28-31. 
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connect between US-based firms and companies at home, and assist the homeland 
companies with recruitment of capital and talent in the home-countries.  
The challenge of brain drain is recognized in Israel. With very high 
percentages of population with advanced degrees, in a relatively small economy, there 
is a perception of a “glass ceiling” within Israel’s entrepreneurship community. Israel 
has 6,602 researchers in R&D per million people, only slightly more than Korea’s 
5,928.54 But with Israel’s 8 million population, and only 8 universities which perform 
research, the notion that in order to really succeed, you need to leave the country, is 
prevalent.  
Israel approached the problem of “brain drain” somewhat counter-
intuitively, but in a way I argue has been more efficient long-term. First, it did not 
invest resources to luring the professionals back, but established deeper connection 
with its scientific community abroad. And second, it counter-balanced the loss of it 
human capital, by establishing large network of bilateral R&D co-operation abroad.   
 
 
  
  
                                          
54 "Researchers in R&D (per Million People)." World Bank. Accessed May 29, 2015. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS.  
31 | P a g e  
 
Informal networks, culture and multinationals 
It is important to note, that all factors influencing the development, or 
failure to do so, discussed in the paper so far, are institutional. The triple helix of 
government-education-private sector are all formal institutions, but the cooperation 
and communication between them is often through informal channels such as the 
security network in Israel, or through ethnic professional associations in Silicon 
Valley. There is another factor that contributed to Israeli innovation eco-system that 
seems to be the result of both formal, institutional actions, and favorable cultural 
perceptions – the presence of multinational corporations. Attracted to Israel by the 
favorable governmental practices such as tax breaks and abundant of human capital, 
those companies flourished in Israel due to lack of negative connotations, or “us vs 
them” mentality, which is an informal aspect. 
As recently as 2013, there was much excitement in Korea about US based 
GE (General Electric) announcing establishment of its subsidiary in Korea. There 
were also rumors of Siemens, a global leader in electric engineering, using Korea as 
its base of operations in the Asia Pacific region.55  The Multinational firms are 
allowed, even encouraged to invest in Korea, but the success of the local 
conglomerates have provided an uphill battle. 
In contrast, GE been present in Israel since 1950, currently operating 8 
R&D centers.56 Siemens has been investing in Israel’s innovation eco-system since 
the 90s, its success leading it to establish Siemens Israel subsidiary in 2000. To date, 
                                          
55 Cho, Mu-hyun. "Multinational Firms Flocking to Korea." Koreatimes. May 2, 2013. Accessed May 22, 2015.   
56 "Multinationals - GE." Invest in Israel (Israeli Ministry of Economy). June 8, 2012. Accessed May 22, 2015.  
 http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/NR/exeres/CEB4D0F6-1AC0-455A-9875-42D5D1A56548.htm 
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Siemens has invested $150 million in Israeli start-ups and venture capital funds.57  
The multinational companies in Israel have a mixed strategy within the 
eco-system: they seek out and purchase the start-ups with the technology solutions 
that they need, preferring absorbing whole companies if needed, rather than 
developing the new technology in-house. But the multinationals also actively engage 
with the eco-system, developing it and the human capital further, as well as with each 
other. For example, Intel Israel is one of the most important subsidiaries of Intel. The 
Sandy Bridge chip developed by Intel Israel accounts for 40% of Global Intel 
Corporation's notebook processors revenue.58 It absorbed the local firms specializing 
in different technologies it deemed necessary to its expansion - Neocleus, experts in 
PC virtualization, Telmap, an Israeli-based navigation software company and Idesia, 
specialists in computer security. On the other hand, Intel also participated in 64 as a 
passive investor - reaping the benefits if the company was successful, and absorbing 
the loss if it was not. Most interestingly, Intel and GE Healthcare set up a joint 
technology evaluation laboratory in Israel. The new lab is located close to both 
headquarters facilities and the managers and employees from both companies work 
together to optimize their products, such as Intel's microprocessors and GE 
Healthcare's ultrasound diagnostic imaging systems.59  
Miscrosoft Israel has followed a similar strategy within the Israeli eco-
system. Relying on local talent it developed several technologies vital to its global 
activities – Microsoft gateway VPN technology; Microsoft Security Essentials anti-
virus suite, the recommendation system for Xbox systems and others. Microsoft also 
                                          
57 "Multinationals - Siemens." Invest in Israel (Israeli Ministry of Economy). June 8, 2012. Accessed May 22, 2015.  
 http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/NR/exeres/CEB4D0F6-1AC0-455A-9875-42D5D1A56548.htm 
58 "Multinationals - Intel." Invest in Israel (Israeli Ministry of Economy). June 8, 2012. Accessed May 22, 2015.  
 http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/NR/exeres/CEB4D0F6-1AC0-455A-9875-42D5D1A56548.htm 
59 Ibid. 
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absorbed companies with narrow specialization such as Peach’s “enhanced TV 
services for digital television”, Gteko, a provider of automated technical support for 
personal computers, Secured Dimensions, with its technology for the protection of 
applications and others.60 Miscrosoft further engaged with the innovation system by 
establishing a Microsoft accelerator, which provided start-up to companies regardless 
of their future profitability, legal aid, free office space, coaching, and mentorship from 
specialists in the technology, finance, investors and CEOs of other start-ups. 
Microsoft takes no equity stake in local start-ups, nor does it provide funding, 
focusing instead in improving communication between Microsoft and start-ups and 
between start-ups themselves.  
Cisco, HP, SAP, Motorola and IBM all follow a similar three-pronged 
strategy. Cisco in particular has received great praise in Israel and worldwide for its 
efforts to connect the Israeli and Palestinian economies and peoples, through 
sponsored technological partnerships. Cisco also engages in several partnerships and 
initiatives to enhance technical capacity, connectivity, education, and opportunities for 
demographics in need such as women and youth in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. In 
the last few years other multinationals established substantial subsidiaries in Israel – 
Apple, Google and so on. 
It is important to note that even though these multinational companies 
compete with each other within the Israeli system and globally, they also cooperate 
with local start-up firms, communities and with each other, as elaborated in case of 
GE and Intel.  
Favorable government policies and lack of pressure from local 
                                          
60 "Multinationals - Microsoft." Invest in Israel (Israeli Ministry of Economy). June 8, 2012. Accessed May 22, 2015.  
 http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/NR/exeres/CEB4D0F6-1AC0-455A-9875-42D5D1A56548.htm 
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companies has contributed to these multinationals flourishing, but this is not an 
obvious development. The multinational companies are not perceived as foreign, alien, 
aggressive forces. They do not have the stigma of colonialism, despite Israel having a 
long colonial history, from ancient Babylon, in 7th century BC, to the British Mandate 
in the 20th century. These companies are trusted to be a part of the local system, as 
another tool that local start-ups can use for funding, or cooperation. In fact, Intel Israel 
has been voted most desired workplace in Israel since 2008, losing the first place only 
last year to Google Israel. In a traditional annual survey, yet again in 2015, 5 out of 10 
most desired workplaces in Israel are High-tech firms, and 4 of those are foreign-
owned.61  
Many start-ups do not have the ambition to become the next multinational 
company such as Checkpoint (as elaborate on page 17), they strive to develop a 
product or technology innovative enough to be purchased by another, bigger company. 
From there they either continue working within that company, or cash out and use the 
new revenue to start another start-up. The size of the “exits” of successful companies 
has been record breaking in the past year.62 Either way – those companies that strive 
to be bought by a bigger company do not distinguish between local, foreign, and 
multinational companies.  
“Trust” has been in the center of this paper, and yet it is so hard to define 
and quantify. The multinational companies are trusted to be equal parts of the local 
eco-system, to respect the laws and customs, and not to take advantage of the smaller 
companies. But the multinationals also trust the viability of the state of Israel. With 
frequent military conflicts, and even more persistent collapses of governments before 
                                          
61 Heruti-Sover, Tali. "Israel's Best Employers: Tech Companies and Monopolies - Business." Haaretz.com. May 8, 2015. 
Accessed May 23, 2015. http://www.haaretz.com/business/.premium-1.655454. 
62 Note to self – mergers and acquisitions.  
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completing a full term, a phenomenon plaguing Israeli politics since the 90s, Israel is 
not an obvious candidate for long-term investment. Nevertheless, multinational 
companies trust that Israel’s science and technology policy, as-well as the tax code 
and tax breaks will continue without interruptions regardless of the party holding the 
power. And indeed, the laws and policies that have influence over the start-up eco-
system, have been consistent over the years.  
The informal aspect of “Trust” is apparent in any and all interactions 
between the players in the eco-system. Trust infuses the interactions between firms, 
between firms and the government, between private sector and academia and so on. 
The acceptance of risk is another informal aspect of Israeli start-up culture. Risk, and 
even failure, are not only accepted, they are embraced. In one of the interviews for 
this research, an Israeli official told the author about the philosophy of the 
former Chief Scientist, Dr. Eli Opper – "…if our re-payment collection rate is high it 
means we failed. We authorized projects that were too easy; we didn't take enough 
risk…” Repeated over and over in meeting and memos, almost like a mantra of the 
OCS, this saying perfectly summarizes the mentality of innovation. Not failing means 
playing it safe, and not pushing the frontiers of the human knowledge further. And on 
the practical side of it: blue sky technology is viewed as a necessary means to expand 
country’s options. The industry needs to be diversified and not dependent on any one 
field and “a bubble”. Taking a risk and failure, are considered vital ingredients in this 
diversification. This acceptance of failure is echoed in the Silicon Valley eco-system, 
by one of the giants of the industry, Executive Chairman of Google: “Someone in a 
garage somewhere is gunning for us, and 2015 could be the year that they make their move. I know, 
because not long ago we were in that garage. And I know that the next Google will not do what 
Google does, just as Google did not do what AOL did.” 
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 DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA  
 
On the surface of it, Israel has taken radically different path than Korea in 
its industrial policy. However, the countries have some characteristics in common 
which makes their paths interesting and beneficial to examine. Israel has no natural 
resources of its own. Like Korea, it was established in 1948 after devastating war, 
deep national trauma and a tumultuous colonial past in the previous year. And like 
Korea, Israel continues to live in somewhat uncertain geopolitical situation, which 
forces it to divert much of its GDP to military and national defense. 
As detailed in the literature review of both the Silicon Valley and Israeli 
experience, several factors need to come together for emergence of start-up eco 
system. Korea has been exceptional in few of those parameters, which made the 
absence of high-tech innovation in small firms all the more puzzling. 
First, Korea has a vast amount of world class high education. The Korean 
universities are consistently ranked at the top of world rankings, competing with 
western “ivy leagues”. Of particular significance is KAIST, an advanced 
technological institute that competes with MIT in USA and attracts applicants from all 
over the world. Secondly, government-private sector cooperation is of great 
importance, as noticeable in the case of Israel and Silicon Valley. Korea’s centralized 
planning was done in close cooperation since the 70s, and continues so to this day. 
Moreover, unlike in Boston or Bangalore, Korean military was influential in Korean 
recent history as it was in Israel and the early days of Silicon Valley. Korea’s relative 
expenditure in R&D is slightly lower than in Israel – in 2014 Israel invested 4.4% of 
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its GDP in R&D, while Korea invested 4%.63 However, with Korea’s economy and 
GDP so much greater in absolute terms, the monetary investment in R&D is 
impressive.  
Korea is consistently ranked very high by international organizations on 
parameters defined as “skills for innovation”. For example, the OECD ranks Korea 
among the highest in their members in “fixed broadband subscriptions per 
population”, “wireless broadband subscriptions per population”, e-government 
development index”, “patents filed by universities and public labs (per GDP)” and 
tertiary education expenditure (per GDP)”. All parameters that are necessary for 
emergence of an innovation eco-system.64  And yet, the start-up eco system in Korea 
is under-developed.  
This study originally was conceived with examining the Korean case 
study in mind as a tool to strengthening the inner logic of the original argument. Such 
is the dynamic nature of Korean development though – this study was conceived and 
mostly written in 2014. At the same time, the new government, which was elected 
only in 2013, has made a large variety of innovations, improvements and re-structures 
in the science and technology sector of Korea, some of them in direct emulation of the 
Israeli model. In response to the fast, and yet still uncompleted restructuring process 
of the science and technology sector, this study was similarly restructured to focus on 
these changes, how they satisfy the conditions of a successful eco-system as outlined 
in the literature review, as-well as pointing out several directions for the future.  
                                          
63  "Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP)." World Bank. Accessed May 29, 2015. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS.  
64 "Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 20014 - Korea." OECD Library. Page 365 
  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-
2014_sti_outlook-2014-en 
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Academia-Government-Industry cooperation 
While the academia in itself in Korea has been well regarded, the 
government has recently undertaken numerous steps to improve the collaboration 
between academia and the rest of the actors in the eco-system. The amount of higher 
education institutions and their respectability has been determined as not enough to 
influence the start-up eco system,. The higher education institutions need to engage 
with the rest of the eco-system, as-well as with each other and partners abroad, to 
ensure an influx of new ideas.  
The public research system in Korea has been historically skewed 
towards applied and development-oriented research, much of which is performed in 
the Government Research Institutes in Korea that supplies technology for industrial 
R&D. The new government allocated USD 109 billion (KRW 92.4 trillion) over the 
next five years to expand public R&D capacity, including national R&D facilities in 
strategic areas. On the industry side - large manufacturing conglomerates are the main 
performers of R&D in Korea, with SMEs and young firms playing much smaller roles. 
The government also plans to stimulate the innovation system through the increase of 
the share of its investments in R&D going to SMEs from 12.4% in 2011 to 18.0% in 
201765 
The government also started programs to support exchanges of 
professors and students between universities and research institutes, and plans to 
establish 18 new joint industry-university-PRI R&D centers by 2017.  
                                          
65 "Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 20014 - Korea." OECD Library. Page 364 
  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-
2014_sti_outlook-2014-en 
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Greater shared use of S&T infrastructure to broaden access to S&T 
knowledge and information is also strongly encouraged. The government research 
institutes are required to devote 15% of their total budget to support SMEs by 2017 
(compared to 7% in 2012) and 3% to transfer technology to SMEs and support human 
resources (compared to 1.76% in 2012).66 
Finally, the government has not spared itself in this restructuring of the 
innovation eco-system. The Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) 
was established in 20013 to support the implementation of the initiatives that were 
elaborated above. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) grouped its 
trade functions with the R&D, industry and energy policy portfolio. In addition, a new 
National S&T Council under the Prime Minister’s Office is the highest decision-
making body on cross-agency STI policy issues. 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
66 "Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 20014 - Korea." OECD Library. Page 366 
  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-
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Human capital: Diversity and Education 
While the exact figures are unknown, Korea is also acutely aware of the 
problem of losing its human capital to overseas. Korea has approached the problem by 
focusing on luring the specialists back to Korea. The research by Lee and Kim (2010) 
is focused on the return rates of US doctoral recipients. Compared to India and China, 
Korea has relatively high percentage, with “brain drain of just 1.4%”.68 While the 
Chinese and Indian work with their respective diasporas in the USA and in particular 
Silicon Valley, the Korean government implements variety of programs to lure the 
scientists back – “the Brain Pool Program” for example, sponsored by the Korean 
Federation of Science and Technology Societies. The program invites Korean 
scientists and engineers abroad and offers temporary positions at universities and 
R&D institutes in Korea. Lowell (2004) also mentions Korea as a country which 
manages to “lure back migrants who have been abroad for many years” with strong 
investment in R&D environments and infrastructure.69  
Patterson (2006) compares the diaspora-homeland cooperative 
development between several nations. The political influence of diasporas on their 
host nation, the technology transfer and financial contribution (remittance and 
investment) has been compared in the study. It points out Israel, China, India and 
South Korea as the most successful in those fields. However, Korea is singled out as a 
case of development IN the diaspora, meaning that the development goes in one 
direction, into the diaspora, unlike Israel and China where diaspora helps to develop 
                                          
68 Jenny J. Lee  and Dongbin Kim. "Brain Gain Or Brain Circulation? U.S. Doctoral Recipients Returning to South 
Korea." Higher Education 59, no. 5 (05, 2010): 627-643. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10734-009-9270-5. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/220945293?accountid=40940. 
69 Lowell, B. Lindsay, and Stefka G. Gerova. "Diasporas and economic development: State of knowledge." Institute for the Study 
of International Migration, Washington DC (2004). 
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the homeland.70  
On the surface, the policies employed by Korea to lure it’s specialists back, 
should have benefited Korea – they keep the best scientists in Korea, working for 
Korean companies and rather than educating the professionals and then lose a high 
percentage of them to the West, the government investment in Korean education 
brings high, and efficient, return rate. However, one of the necessary parameters for 
innovation is varied experiences and point of view, which come from diverse 
demographics. Korean professionals leave Korea for few years in favor of the West, 
than come back. Korea has not been successful in attracting foreign talent or in 
cooperating with its diaspora in the Silicon Valley; it is just tries to lure it back.  
The efficient connection to diaspora has measurable, economic benefits, claims 
Saxanian (2002). “For every 1% increase in the number of first-generation immigrants 
from a given country, for example, California's exports to that country go up nearly 
0.5%.” Foreign-born professionals in Silicon Valley invest in start-ups or venture 
funds in their homeland countries. Currently, the leading groups of the investment in 
the homeland are Indian Diaspora with 22%, Taiwanese 17 % and mainland Chinese 
10%,71 the same groups highlighted by Patterson, Lee and Kim above.  
As was discussed in the literature review, diversity of ideas and 
populations are important in establishing a successful entrepreneur culture. Both 
Korea and Israel has several bilateral international science and technology 
cooperation networks. However, so far Korea’s tends to focus on the regional co-
operation with China, Japan, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Malaysia and so on, as well as 
                                          
70 Patterson, Rubin. "Transnationalism: Diaspora-Homeland Development." Social Forces 84, no. 4 (06, 2006): 1891-1907. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/229872250?accountid=40940. 
71 Saxenian, AnnaLee. "BRAIN CIRCULATION. How high-skill immigration makes everyone better off." Brookings Review 20, 
no. 1 (2002): 28-31. 
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USA, as a close ally.72 Only USA and China of those are significant R&D producers. 
Within the EU, so far Korea’s cooperation is limited to only 9 countries, focusing only 
on the larger economies such as Germany, UK, Turkey and Sweden.73  
Korea could expand its creative economy by stepping out of its comfort 
zone and expanding its R&D cooperation with more countries, in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe. Currently Israel and Korea cooperate under KORIL foundation 
(Korea-Israel Industrial R&D foundation). The foundation gives grants up to 1 million 
USD74 to collaborative R&D between Israeli and Korean firm, as-well as working as 
sort of match-maker between the firms looking to expand their R&D. The grants are 
given on the conditions the innovation will be beneficial to both countries’ economies. 
Israel mitigated the loss of human capital, by activating human capital worldwide, 
through more than 40 similar bilateral foundations and several multilateral. 
Expending its network of R&D collaboration, as-well as engaging the Korean 
diaspora abroad, could be a meaningful boost to the Korean innovation system.   
Another program which could benefit the Korean innovation eco-system 
immensely: Korea is well below the OECD median for international co-authorship 
and co-patenting.75 A traditionally strong focus on applied research and technological 
development performed largely in governmental research institutes are mostly to 
blame. With Korea being so ethnically homogenous, and the different actors in the 
                                          
72  "International Cooperation." KISTEP - Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning. Accessed May 29, 2015. 
http://www.kistep.re.kr/en/c5/sub1.jsp. 
73 "Main Bilateral Programmes between Korea and EU." Access4.eu: RTDI PROGRAMME DATABASE. Accessed May 29, 
2015. http://www.access4.eu/southkorea/630.php.  
74 "About KORIL-RDF." Korea-Israel Industrial R&D Foundation. Accessed May 29, 2015.  
http://www.koril-rdf.or.kr/english/koril/index3.php?seq=3&subseq=1_ 
75 "Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 20014 - Korea." OECD Library. Page 366 
  http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-
2014_sti_outlook-2014-en 
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eco-system competing rather cooperating with each other, new ideas have little 
opportunity to circulate. This OECD statistic is specifically surprising due to the fact 
so many of the Koreans study or work some time abroad as part of their work-life.  
Co-invention and co-authorship with international partners could 
contribute to the “brain circulation” and the diversity of ideas, as-well as with bring 
new technology and opportunities to Korea. The low level of patent applications with 
foreign co-inventors is partly due to Korea’s conglomerate industrial structure, which 
tends to retain technology development within the group.76  
With so many changes in the government-industry-academia triple helix, 
this particular field remains Korea’s next big challenge. Focusing on applied research 
only, and keeping it within the conglomerates, effectively kills the innovation 
opportunities. Further, it is also harmful for conglomerates themselves. Pooling their 
resources together, or simply investing in the eco-system on the whole and then just 
purchasing the successful innovation solutions developed by smaller firms,  is 
cheaper than developing all the new technologies in-house. Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, 
HP, SAP, Motorola and IBM all successfully demonstrated that strategy in the past in 
Israel.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
76 Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 20014 - Korea." OECD Library. Page 366 
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Informal networks, trust and risk taking culture 
It is important to note, that all factors influencing the development, or 
failure to do so, discussed in the paper so far, are institutional. The triple helix of 
government-education-private sector are all formal institutions, but the cooperation 
and communication between them is often through informal channels such as the 
security network in Israel, or through ethnic professional association in Silicon Valley.  
 In Korea in particular, there are both formal and informal institutions that 
stand in a way of a successful start-up eco-system: the structure of the economy, 
including the governmental assistance, is encouraging innovation, but in the big 
corporations and not small private companies. The government also encourages the 
Korean diaspora to return, but does not connect with Koreans abroad, such as those 
found in Silicon Valley.  
But it is also important to note that the culture itself is a part of the 
influencing factors, and many returnees return because they want to. The same article 
by Lee and Kim, found that many candidates that returned to Korea after study in the 
US, did so simply because they initially took the opportunity to study or work in the 
USA as means to advance in Korea later on. The connection of Korean diaspora with 
the homeland cannot be only attributed to formal institutions, but to more informal 
codes of conduct and values, that require deeper discussion on the nature of informal 
institutions that serve as an obstacle to possible reform in Korea.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper attempted to answer what factors have made Israel a successful 
incubator for start-up businesses. The introduction elaborated on some of the features 
and successes of the Israeli case. The first part of the literature review sketched a 
theoretical framework for research of start-ups. It was complimented by looking at 
some of the unsuccessful start-up eco-systems in the world and the factors that were 
lacking in those cases. The author then concluded that the factors that were lacking in 
those failure cases, were the same factors that were integral for the success of eco-
system such as in Silicon Valley. Most of the research into start-ups is relatively recent, 
and lacks a systematic approach, even more so in the case of Israel. Focusing on the 
research globally, and extending it to failures, helped mitigate that challenge 
somewhat. In the second half of the literature review, the research that looks directly 
at the case of innovation in Israel was examined. The same factors were repeated such 
as in the elsewhere global case studies: the human capital factors such as education 
and diversity of backgrounds and ideas, the government-private sector-academia 
cooperation, and the informal networks and factors such as “trust”, “risk-taking” and 
“risk sharing” were also discussed. In the course of the research, additional aspect of 
the Israeli case study was added – multinational companies. Not a separate issue by 
itself, the multinationals were allowed to flourish in Israel due to both favorable 
conditions set by the Israeli government, and cooperation and trust from other actors 
in the eco-system and the general public.  
In the discussion portion of the paper, those factors were applied to the 
case of South Korea, which is a prime example of a country with high quality of 
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human capital, and which could potentially be the next thriving eco-system. The cases 
of South Korea and Israel are not perfectly compatible. More thought and research 
should be devoted in the future of linking the development of these two countries. The 
two countries themselves desire to be linked together, and the steps the Korean 
government took recently to adapt the “start-up nation” model to the Korean case. 
Further research into the applicability of the Israeli research elsewhere could benefit 
other countries striving to develop knowledge based economy, as-well as help 
building a more comprehensive theory of high-tech innovation.  
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VII. SIGNIFICANCE AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Maximization of resources has always been a matter of great concern for 
most nations. This issue is poised to be the most important question of the 21st century, 
on national and global levels. Natural resources are limited and growing thin, but 
human potential is still poorly utilized.  
While prevention of natural disasters or ecological damage is hampered 
by politics, human inventiveness allows us to work around objective adversity like 
climate change, and in the future will be our greater resource. Maximization of human 
capital on a national level would benefit all, but particularly developing countries. 
One future direction for this research is applying the Israeli start-up model 
on the economy of South Korea. Both are relatively small nations with limited natural 
resources, high military spending, and highly educated populations. Applying the 
Israeli model of start-up economy to the case study of South Korea would provide 
answers to a subsidiary research question: Given the similarities between Israel and 
South Korea what strategies and policies could South Korea adopt to create a similar 
start-up Eco-system? If proven to be successful, adapting the Israeli model to other 
knowledge based economies can provide an incentive for developing more 
knowledge-based economies elsewhere. 
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